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MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER
Marlin M. Volz*
As a spring blizzard raged through Kansas, one of its most
gifted sons assumed his "seat on the nation's highest Court and
quietly subscribed to the oath:
I, Charles E. Whittaker, do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to
the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent on me as
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agree-

ably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help
me God.

Unlike the cold wave sweeping through his boyhood town of
Troy, Kansas, on this 25th day of March 1957, the weather
outside the court building was moderately warm but the seat he
took on the extreme right end of the bench was warmer. By the
end of the term it would be hotter - much hotter. Suggestive of
the angry protests still emanating from the school segregation
decision were the overcast sky and the gusty wind on this March
day. Visitors leaving the Court at the end of the day's session
might have observed that the weather looked as though it would
blow in a storm. On June 17, 1957, the gale struck with the
0 1958 University of Notre Dame Press
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Kansas City School of Law. A.B.,
University of Wisconsin, 1938, LL.B., 1940, SJ.D., 1945.
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announcement of the Yates, Service, Watkins and Sweezy
decisions.
If the motto "Equal Justice Under Law" above the front
entrance of the Supreme Court building was in keeping with its
opinion in the school segregation cases, surely the words chiseled
above the rear end of the structure "Justice The Guardian of
Liberty" were in harmony with the Court's vigorous championship of individual rights. Since the members of the Court use the
back entrance, one wonders what inspirational effect such words
may have upon their determinations. In any event, by July 1st of
last year no one could doubt that the Supreme Court was the
guardian of the liberties of defendants in criminal or contempt
proceedings.
Mr. Justice Whittaker Took No Part
With only Justice Clark dissenting, the Supreme Court in
the Jencks case1 in an opinion handed down on June 3, 1957,
by Mr. Justice Brennan aroused a storm of criticism by holding
that the defendant had a right to inspect all reports of two
government witnesses in the sacrosanct F.B.I. records. Hardly
had the critics of the Court regained their breath, when on
Monday, June 17, 1957, the Court announced decisions which
had the effect of acquitting five Los Angeles Communists and
granting a new trial to nine others convicted under the Smith
Act,2 of reversing the loyalty-risk discharge of former diplomat
John Stewart Service, 3 of reversing the contempt of Congress
conviction of labor organizer John Watkins, 4 and of reversing
the contempt conviction of Paul Sweezy, dismissed as lecturer at
the University of New Hampshire for refusing to answer questions concerning alleged subversive activities. 5
1 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). Justices Frankfurter, Burton,
and Harlan separately concurred. Justice Whittaker did not participate.
2
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). Majority opinion by Justice
Harlan, separate concurring opinions by Justice Burton and Justices Black and
Douglas, the latter two also dissenting in part. Justice Clark dissented. Justices
Brennan and Whittaker did not take part.
3 Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957). Unanimous decision written for the
Court by Justice Harlan. Justice Clark did not participate.
4 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). Majority decision by Chief
Justice Warren, concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter, dissent by Justice Clark.
Justices Burton and Whittaker took no part.
5 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) Justices Black, Douglas and
Brennan joined Chief Justice Warren in the majority opinion. Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan separately concurred. Dissenting were Justices Burton and Clark. Justice
Whittaker did not participate.
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Without in many cases mentioning the due process considerations prompting the Court's actions, articles appeared bitterly
denouncing the Court, particularly in the so-called patriotic
journals. Cried the American Legion magazine in an article by
J. B. Matthews, 6 "On Red Monday, June 17, 1957, the Supreme
Court handed down a batch of decisions which brought jubilation to the ranks of subversives all over the United States."
Editorialized Life magazine, 7 "at least two grounds [exist] on
which sober friends of the Bill of Rights can refuse to join the
liberal torchlight processions." And Time magazine commented:8 "Not since the nine old men shot down Franklin Roosevelt's
Blue Eagle in 1935 has the Supreme Court been the center of
such general commotion in newspapers and in the bar. The New
York Times trotted out the kind of headlines usually reserved for
war or disaster."
This is not to say that the critics were correct in their appraisal
of the Court and its decisions; but it must be conceded that at
the end of the 1956 term, they were much more vocal in their
criticisms than were the friends of the Court in their support.
This focused the Attention of the legal world upon Mr. Justice
Whittaker because he had been appointed too late to participate
in the controversial decisions, except the one reinstating John
Stewart Service. Remaining unanswered were the questions
posed by U.S. News and World Report: 9 "Down which road?
In his decisions will he be 'liberal', 'conservative', 'middle of the
road'?" Life magazine observed that "his role in the Warren
court is not yet known,"'1 and Time magazine called him "still
the Court's big question mark."'"
The Supreme Court Justices, including Justice Whittaker,
could not escape controversy even during the summer recess for
they were called back for a special sitting to hear the Girard
case.'" After stating the facts and making a general assertion of
the law, the Court in a per curiam decision reversed the lower
court, held that Japan had jurisdiction to try Girard and stated
that "the wisdom of the arrangement is exclusively for the determination of the Executive and Legislative Branches."
6

Oct., 1957, p. 14.
July 1, 1957, p. 30.
July 1, 1957, p. 11, col. 3.
9 U.S. News and World Report, April 5, 1957, p. 19.
10 Life, July 1, 1957, p. 36.
11 Time, July 1, 1957, p. 13.
12 Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957). Justice Douglas did not participate.
7
8
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The Court's Techniques Are Criticized
In recent years considerable criticism has been directed at
the quality of Supreme Court opinions and this naturally increases interest in Justice Whittaker's skill as a judicial craftsman. Following are the most common complaints leveled at
some of the Court's judicial techniques and practices.
The per curiam opinion in the Girardcase pointed up the increasing use which the Court was making of this device to dispose of cases without reasoning through to a conclusion. This
was stressed by Professors Bickel and Wellington in their recent
article in the Harvard Law Review: 13
The Court's product has shown an increasing incidence of the
sweeping dogmatic statement, of the formulation of results
accompanied by little or no effort to support them in reason,
in sum, in opinions that do not opine and of per curiam orders
that quite frankly fail to build the bridge
between the authorities
14
they cite and the results they decree.

Criticism of summary per curiam opinions has also come
from within the Court itself as witness Justice Clark's dissenting
opinion in Gold v. United States.15 Such opinions do not decide
the issues urged upon the Court for decision by counsel unless
ruled by a cited case, and, for this reason, they are particularly
distressing to the litigants as well as to the trial judge where he
has been reversed without a statement of reasons. Justice Clark's
dissent in the Gold case merits extended quotation:
I am also disturbed by the refusal of the Court to decide
other important questions urged upon us by both parties and
ready for disposition. Among these are ....

It seems to me that

proper judicial administration requires this Court to decide
these important issues, particularly since they will again arise
at the retrial. Furthermore, similar cases involving the same
legal points are pending in various districts throughout the
country. The refusal of the majority today to pass upon them
thus deprives the federal judiciary of this Court's opinion,

13 Bickel and Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1957).

14 Id. at 3. The article continues on the same page: "This is very possibly a
feature, even if not always a deliberate one, of the Court's response to today's
controversy. The controversy has undoubtedly and understandably increased the
pressure for unity within the Court and placed a great premium on opinions which
have the vacuity characteristic of desperately negotiated documents. Moreover, the
less an opinion says, the less there may be in it for critics of the Court to seize
upon for their own purposes; and one wonders whether it is not for this reason
also that opinions have, of late, often said very little and have carried an air of
assertion, as opposed to one of deliberation and rational choice."
15 352 U.S. 985 (1957).
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which renders today's error multifold. It will cause undue
hardship in the trial of all of these cases, not only on the
Government but on the defendants as well. I therefore dissent.] 6

Another criticism, which has arisen principally from the
school segregation and Watkins"r cases, is that the Court leans
too heavily in some instances on historical, emotional and
sociological considerations and insufficiently on conventional
legal authorities and reasoning. This reproach is not limited to
legal journals. Time magazine on July 1, 1957, referring to the
school segregation decision, commented: "While millions cheered
the result, many lawyers had an uneasy feeling that it hung on
too much sociological ballooning and not enough legal ballast."' 8
Life magazine's editorial of the same day was even more severe:
"Instead of precedent, it leans on sociology and public opinion;
it overrules itself without making the law any clearer, let alone
any more predictable."' 9
In advising clients, lawyers must be able intelligently to determine the present state of the law and also to prophesy with
reasonable accuracy its future development. Unquestionably the
Supreme Court in recent years has compounded the work of the
lawyer both in ascertaining what the present law is and in predicting what it will be tomorrow and the next day. The difficulty
is due largely to the multiplicity of opinions in many cases, which
obscures the holding of the Court, and in the inordinate proclivity of the Court to divide.
In judging the work of the Court and in evaluating criticisms
directed against it, the staggering work load and the awful
responsibilities. of the nine justices must be kept in mind. Most
distressing was the significant rise in the business of the Court
and the increase in the backlog of cases occurring during the
1956 term. In its survey of the work of the Court for this term,
the Harvard Law Review20 reported:
The most significant set of figures concerning the work of the
1956 term is the total number of cases placed on each of the
various dockets. Although the number of cases disposed of by
the Court increased, the number of cases remaining on the
dockets at the end of the term rose significantly.

Overburdened, the members of the Court simply do not have the
time for independent research and reflection and for the har16 Jd. at 986.
17 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
18 Time, July 1, 1957, p. 12.
19 Life, July 1, 1957, p. 30.
20 The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 HARv. L. REv. 81, 95 (1957).
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monizing of views through conference and discussion. It is interesting to note that hand in hand with the increase in the total
number of cases before it went a marked increase in the number
of its dissenting and concurring opinions. For the 1956 term
only 29% of the decisions in which full opinions were written2
were unanimous.
A study of the dissenting opinions is particularly revealing in
that it shows the customary alignments of the justices and the
proclivity of individual members of the Court to dissent or concur in separate opinions. While it is dangerous to generalize,
since the alignments are not hard and fast, one conclusion is
inescapable: the Eisenhower appointees do not vote as a block.
Another safe assumption is that Justices Black and Douglas will
be together. Joining them frequently are Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Brennan. Excluding Justice Whittaker, at the end of
the 1956 term a strong tendency for two or three and sometimes
all four of the other justices to align themselves together could
be observed. Where the Court seriously divided, Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Clark and Harlan, or at least three of them,
were usually found on the same side. 2
With the Court thus falling loosely into two groups of four
justices each, Justice Whittaker's vote on close questions could
easily be decisive. Which foursome, if either, will he most likely
join? Lest we are carried away at this point in assigning an undue
importance to his one vote, it must be recalled that most of the
controversial decisions of recent years were not 5 to 4 holdings.
The vote in the school segregation decision was 9-0, in Jencks
7-1, in Yates 7-0, in Watkins 6-1, in Service 8-0, and in Sweezy
6-2. This is not to minimize the importance of Justice Whittaker's vote or his influence upon the votes of other justices, for
he excels in the art of persuasion and argumentation. In view
also of the serious criticisms directed at the quality of some of its
opinions and at some of the Court's techniques and practices, his
skill as a judicial craftsman and his views on judicial administration should be of about as much interest to lawyers as whether
he is a liberal, conservative, or an independent thinker.
It is time to look at his record.
21 Id., Table IV (B) at 103. The authors of the survey also write: "This increase in business was also reflected in the total number of opinions written by the
justices which increased by 27% over the number written during the 1955 term.
The number of dissenting opinions showed a marked increase while the number of
unanimous opinions declined." Id. at 95.
22 These alignments, not fast to be sure, are borne out by table IV (B) of the
Harvard Supreme Court Note, id. at 103.
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His Background
It is the strength of America that an able and willing individual as Justice Whittaker can rise to the top almost entirely
through his own efforts. His parents and family, his law school,
his office associates, and the smiles of fortune all contributed to
his success, but essentially he is a self-made man. Born on
Washington's birthday in 1901 on a 320 acre farm near Troy,
Kansas, he attended a one-room, one-teacher country school and
rode six miles on horseback to high school, dropping out regretfully before graduation. Loving the law from his earliest recollection, he earned $700 from trapping and plowing and at
nineteen years of age was permitted to enter the Kansas City
School of Law (now the University of Kansas City School of
Law), which then was an evening law school. He worked his way
through the law school as a part-time office boy for a leading
Kansas City law firm, Watson, Gage and Ess. At the same time
he completed his high school studies by private tutoring.
Upon passing the Missouri bar examination he was admitted
to practice in 1923, one year before -graduation from the law
school. He took a position with the law firm which he had served
as office boy, becoming a junior partner in 1930 and a full
partner in 1932. In 1953 he was elected President of the Missouri Bar, Integrated. On July 19, 1954, by appointment of
President Eisenhower he took office as United States district
judge for the Western District of Missouri. On June 22, 1956,
he was elevated to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit; and, on March 25, 1957, he took the oath and
assumed his place as an associate justice of the United States
Supreme Court.
His Qualificationsfor the FederalBench
During all this time he displayed a passionate, 100% devotion
to the law and to the perfection of his own talents. A prominent
Kansas City lawyer, and a close friend of his, recently wrote:
Charlie always was interested in oratory and especially
oratory of the court room variety. He also was deeply interested
in beautiful language contained in court opinions. He was
particularly intrigued by the language of Judge Trimble in the
case of Meredith v. Krauthoff, 177 S.W. 1112 [Missouri], a
child custody case of more than passing interest. As a young
lawyer, he memorized a great portion of that opinion and used
to recite it with fine oratorical effect and considerable emotion.
He was interested in fine legal logic and reasoning and equally
interested in seeing such fine legal logic and reasoning expressed
in beautiful language.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Vol. XXXIII

Charlie always loved to argue. He was a born advocate. Often,
I would be working on some legal problem and would state it
to him, hoping to obtain agreement upon my views. He would
invariably take the opposite side and point out every conceivable weakness of my position. Of course, he was more helpattitude, but it shows his disposition and
ful to me in taking that 23
quick and fertile mind.

Justice Whittaker admired, observed and often emulated the
great trial lawyers of his day. Senator James Reed was a favorite.
One of his best imitations is of the Senator announcing himself
ready for trial and, when he did so, added Mr. Whittaker, no
one could doubt that his client was well represented. Nor was
there ever any doubt about the adequacy of the representation of
any of Mr. Whittaker's clients.
He has a phenomenal knowledge of law and grasp of the
fundamentals, both of substance and procedure. Above all he
knows how to dig deeply in researching a problem, to use effectively legal authorities and to state a proposition logically, clearly and precisely. Especially, he is adept in the use of judicial
decisons. When he entered the judiciary after thirty years of his
kind of law practice, he was not only well prepared for the
trial bench but he thoroughly appreciated the role of the judge
in the American legal system. He knew what the lawyer expected
from the judge in presiding at trials and in writing opinions. He
understood the functions of the written judicial opinion from
the lawyer's standpoint, which, among others, are clearly to
decide and dispose of the case, state the facts and the issues
precisely, answer the meritorious contentions of counsel, define
the limits of the holding where misinterpretation is possible, and
through strong and convincing reasoning arrive at conclusions
which gain a reasoned and general acceptance. On the bench he
would be a lawyer's judge. His "closely reasoned, clearly stated
opinions" as a district and court of appeals judge undoubtedly
were a major factor in his elevation to the High Court.24
But let Justice Whittaker himself state the reasons President
Eisenhower gave for his selection as reported in the New York
Times. In answering a question as to what the President had
said to him, he stated: 2 5
The President said he felt my long and active experience as a
trial lawyer, then as a trial judge, followed by experience as an

23

24

25

Letter to the writer from Walter A. Raymond, Dec. 20, 1957.
See Time, March 11, 1957, p. 17, col. 3.
N.Y. Times, March 3, 1957, p. 58, col. 3.

1958]

MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER

appellate judge, admirably qualified me as a Supreme Court
Justice.

Though a life-long Republican, he had never been active in
politics. Though he ardently expressed his position on legal
questions, particularly at the lawyers' table in Wolferman's Tiffin
Room in Kansas City, his views on controversial public questions
were not on record and were generally unknown by even his
closest friends. There was no problem of being consistent with
prior statements and actions. He had crusaded for no cause
except the better practice of law and the administration of justice.
He had no past commitments. When he took the oath on March
25, 1957, he was free to call each case as he saw it, after careful
study and consideration; and no one who knew him had any
doubt but that he would do so. "I read the law only for understanding of its meaning," he has said, "and apply and enforce it
in accordance with my understanding."2 6
His Appointment Is Acclaimed
That Justice Whittaker fitted the specifications held by interested persons for a Supreme Court Justice is evident by the
wide and nearly universal acceptance which the announcement
of his appointment received. Bernard G. Segal, Chairman of the
American Bar Association's Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary 7 praised the appointment: "The nomination of Judge
Whittaker meets the highest standards of the American Bar
Association." The Judiciary Committee and the Senate speedily
approved his nomination. Of magazines and newspapers only
Nation' s seemed critical and its criticism was based on his
decision as a United States district judge in the Davis case, 29 in
which he dismissed Davis' complaint against the University of
Kansas City. His language in that case is worthy of extensive
quotation since it is likely that similar questions will be presented
to the Supreme Court:
This squarely presents the question of whether plaintiff's
refusal to answer the questions propounded to him by University officials at the meeting of-August 4, 1953, asking whether

or not he is or ever was a member of the Communist party,
constitutes "adequate cause" for his dismissal.
I believe it does. Plaintiff had a lawful right, under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, to refuse to answer, and no
26
27
28
29

As reported in Life, July 1, 1957, p. 36.
N.Y. Times, March 3, 1957, p. 58, col. 4
184 THE NATION 245 (1957).
Davis v. University of Kansas City, 129 F. Supp. 716 (W.D.Mo. 1955).
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inference of criminality can be drawn from his failure to
answer. But he did not have a Constitutional right to remain
a public school teacher. And the refusal of a teacher - in a
most intimate position to mould the minds of the youth of the
country - to answer to the responsible officials of the school
whether he is a member of a found and declared conspiracy
by a godless group to overthrow our government by force,
constitutes an "adequate cause" for the dismissal of such a
teacher. The public will not stand, and they ought not to stand,
for such reticence or refusals to answer by the teachers in their
schools. And the University officials would have been derelict
in their duties had they not asked plaintiff - in the light of
his refusal to answer the Senate subcommittee's question as to
whether he was a Communist - whether he was or ever had
been a member of the Communist Party, and, having asked
him those questions, and he having refused to answer them,
would have 30been derelict in their duties . . . had they not dismissed him.

From this language it is more logical to suppose that Justice
Whittaker would have joined in the dissent in the Sweezy case,
rather than sided with the majority, had he participated in its
consideration and decision.
His PriorJudicialExperience
During his twenty-three month tenure as a United States
district judge for the Western District of Missouri, 3 1 forty-seven
of his opinions appear to have been published: thirty-six in
volumes 122 through 141 of the Federal Supplement and eleven
in volumes 16 through 18 of the Federal Rules Decisions. The
bulk of these concern rulings on motions; eight for summary
judgment,32 seven to dismiss,3 3 four to quash service,3 4 five relating to discovery proceedings, three to modify previous orders,
two for a more definite statement, and one each, to set aside a
default judgment, for a bill of particulars, to intervene, and to
add a party plaintiff. Three opinions involved criminal matters
two for habeas corpus and the third, a motion by the defen129 F. Supp. at 718.
He served in such capacity from July 19, 1954, to June 22, 1956.
32 The subject matter of such actions involved serviceman's life insurance, assault
and battery, treble damages for excessive rents, rescission of sale of stock, real
party in interest, liability of owner of automobile, revelation of trade secrets, and
accord and satisfaction.
33 The grounds for such motions were: improper venue (2), failure to state a
claim for which relief could be granted (4), and operation of statute of limitations
(1).
34 In each instance the main issue was the validity of service upon a foreign
corporation.
30
31
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dant to vacate a sentence imposed after a guilty plea. The remaining decisions concerned the following: bankruptcy (2),
Clayton Act (1), refund of income tax (1), trusts (1), injunction (1), chattel mortgages (2), landlord and tenant (1),
creditors' rights (1), and patents ( 1 ). While many of the matters
considered in these opinions do not ordinarily reach the Supreme
Court, it is significant that his first opinion as a justice of that
Court involved a venue problem, 35 similar to those which he
was accustomed to deal with as a district judge.
For nine months he was a judge on the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, during which time he participated in thirty-three decisions. 38 He wrote the opinion for the
37
court in eleven instances and filed one dissenting opinion.
Seven of the appeals were from decisions of the Tax Court, one
from the Federal Trade Commission, one from the NLRB and
one from an order of the Secretary of Labor. The remaining
decisions involved questions relating to bankruptcy (3), criminal
law (5), contracts (1), condemnation (1), trusts (2), insurance
(5), torts (3), procedure (2), and writ of prohibition (1).
During his service on the Court of Appeals, he was assigned
on several occasions to hear district court matters; and, in this
capacity he wrote three additional opinions, which appear in
volumes 146 and 147 of the Federal Supplement. One of these,
Carpenterv. Borden,38 was a trademark case which he heard in
an Iowa district court; and, in the other two instances, he wrote
the opinions in Jones Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States39 and
Arkansas PublicService Comm'n v. United States4" while serving
as the circuit court member on two three-judge district courts
sitting in Arkansas to review orders of the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
What conclusions, beyond the obvious, may be drawn from
his experience on the federal bench prior to assuming his seat
on the Supreme Court? First, his reputation as a sure-footed,
hard-working legal scholar was immensely enhanced and con35 Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Co., 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
36 Justice Whittaker served on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals from June
22, 1956, to March 25, 1957.
37 In Fitts' Estate v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1956), he dissented
from the majority holding that the evidence supported the Tax Court's finding of the
fair market value of stock for estate tax purposes. In one other instance he dissented
without opinion. Milwaukee Insurance Co. v. Kogen, 240 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1957).
38 147 F. Supp. 445 (S.D. Iowa 1956).
39 146 F. Supp. 697 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
40 147 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Ark. 1956).
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cretely demonstrated."' Secondly, he assisted materially in clearing up lagging dockets, which quality should prove useful in
coping with the Supreme Court's mounting backlog. 42 Thirdly,
he showed a capacity for getting on well with his judicial associates; and, as a judge of the court of appeals, he learned the fine
art of the give and take of the conference table in harmonizing
and reconciling differences of opinion, in recognizing the validity
in the views of others while confirming those of his own and in
arriving at unanimity through discussion. Fourthly, his opinions
were models of orderliness, of the use of direct, exact and concise language, of logical, careful and persuasive reasoning, of the
expert analysis and application of legal authorities. They were
readable and to the point. There could be no doubt as to what
the court had held. In short, he showed himself to be a top-flight
judicial craftsman.
His JudicialSkills
His opinions are pleasing to the lawyer because they state the
facts orderly and concisely, set forth the issue before the court
with exactness, deal with each meritorious contention of counsel,
reason convincingly to the conclusion, and announce the holding
of the Court with unmistakable definiteness. His ability to cut to
the heart of a proposition and reduce it to language easily understood is well
demonstrated by his dissent in Fitts' Estate v. Com43
missioner:
The issue was: what was the fair market value, per share, of
the stock in question at the date of Mrs. Fitts' death on February 10, 1949? As correctly said by the majority, fair market
value is the price that a willing buyer would pay and a willing
seller would take for the property - in other words, it is what

you could get for it.
Petitioners returned this stock at $150.00 per share. The
Commissioner set it up at $600.00 per share. The Tax Court
found its value to be $375.00 per share -

difference
about the
the basis
plaintiff's

an exact split of the

between the parties. This is reminiscent of the pun
old justice of the peace who made his decisions upon
that there are three sides to every lawsuit - the
side, the defendant's side and the right side, which

41 Life, July 1, 1957, p. 36, commented: "He will likely make his decisions as a
legal scholar." Time magazine wrote, on the same day, that "his opinions were
lauded by the bar for their reasoning." Time, July 1, 1957, p. 13.
42 Time, March 11, 1957, p. 16, observed: "In both courts, hardworking, scholarly Judge Whittaker did much to clear up lagging dockets, and his closely reasoned,
clearly stated opinions won favorable attention throughout the Justice Department."
43 237 F.2d at 734.
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is the middle. Upon what evidence does that finding rest? I
think none at all.

His unusual ability to come directly to the point and to state
his own view positively by precise, pithy phraseology is illustrated by Smith v. Christian4 4 - and this is typically Whittaker:
The question, thus, is whether defendants . . . were . . .
person[s] ... in charge of the motor vehicle.., with the express
or implied consent of the owner ....
Plaintiff says yes. Defendants, Stevens and Metcalf, say no.
There is no decision in Missouri precisely upon the question....

That he is capable of strong feelings and of giving forcible
expression to them is apparent from a reading of Miller v. United
States, 5 in which the government's answer challenged his jurisdiction to hear a suit by a widow for proceeds of a serviceman's
life insurance policy. Wrote Judge Whittaker:
Upon first reading, this position shocks the conscience. Further study of the law has not changed my first impression. Servicemen who lose their lives in the service of our country, and the
families of those men, are not the discretionary cestuis of a
beneficent Veterans Administration, but, rather, are the beneficiaries of a grateful America, whose Congress, by the adoption of Subchapter II of Title 38 U.S.C.A. gave them a vested
property right in the life insurance thereby afforded. 4 6

And feel the freshness and vivaciousness of his language
when he was compelled to hold against a plaintiff in a pathetic
47
plight:
The facts giving rise to these actions are indeed "story book",
and are as "unbelievable" in this modern age as they are interesting....
While I have great sympathy for him, and, I think rather
naturally, would like to find a way to protect him even against
his own folly, which may be likened to the Greek philosopher
who stepped in a well while looking at the stars and from
which came the maxim "He who looks sees the peril that the
heedless encounter", but I have been unable to find a basis in
the law that gives any right to him against this defendant.

One of the criticisms of the Supreme Court noted earlier is
that it occasionally summarily disposes of a case without giving
the litigants and the lower court the satisfaction of discussing
their contentions. In his opinions, both as a judge on the district
124 F. Supp. 201, 202 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
124 F. Supp. 203 (W.D. Mo. 1954). The quoted language was adopted by
Chief Judge Clark in Wilkinson v. United States, 242 F.2d 735, 736 (8th Cir. 1957):
"We agree with the forceful and persuasive opinion of Judge, now Mr. Justice,
Whittaker in Miller v. United States. . . . We shall follow it."
46 Id. at 204-05.
47 Farm Bureau Cooperative Mills and Supply, Inc. v. Blue Star Foods, Inc.,
137 F. Supp. 486, 488, 491 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
44
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court and on the court of appeals, Justice Whittaker took pains
carefully to consider each contention and to answer it effectively.
If he thought the proposition without merit, he said so. In Southern Kansas Greyhound Lines v. United States,48 he concluded,
"This treats with all of the points raised by the plaintiffs and
shows that they are each without merit."
If the parties had briefed and submitted an important question,
he considered it even though it might have been sidestepped. In
Wessing v. American Indemnity Co.,49 he could have avoided
the troublesome question of whether the plaintiff must first pay
the judgment before suing an insurance company for bad faith
in failing to settle a suit within the policy limits. But, having
practiced law for thirty years, he knew the importance of a
definitive answer to the problem. Stated Judge Whittaker:
But, to rest this decision, solely, upon the fact that at least
nominal damages would be recoverable, if plaintiffs make a
submissible case of "bad faith", would be unsatisfactory and to
leave the substantive question dangling....

And in ExhibitorsService, Inc. v. Abbey Rents,5 ° he answered
questions as to jurisdiction and venue upon a motion to amend a
complaint to include a foreign corporation, even though such
amendment would be granted "as of course" and the jurisdictional question considered on later motions. The parties had
briefed the point and filed affidavits; and they urged him to
decide the matter before they brought in a party as to which
jurisdiction and venue might be lacking.
Sometimes counsel raised a point without supporting authorities; and, in those instances, he researched the proposition on his
own and considered it. His opinion in United States v. Harris,"-' is
an example:
The District Attorney then questions, however, whether the
matter of limitations is jurisdictional, or a mere procedural
matter of affirmative defense which was waived by defendant
through failure to assert it defensively and by his plea of guilty;
and, without citation of authority, he states the latter to be his
view and checks the question up to the Court for decision.

If there were danger that the scope of a decision might be
misunderstood or extended beyond his intention, he included a
statement defining its boundaries. Thus, in In re McKinley,52 he
wrote:
48
49
50

51
52

134 F. Supp. 502, 511 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
127 F. Supp. 775, 780 (W.D. Mo. 1955).

135 F. Supp. 112 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
133 F. Supp. 796, 798 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
138 F. Supp. 4, 8 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
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I desire to say and to make most explicit that I have here
dealt only with chattel mortgages and have not considered or in
any way dealt with the recording of instruments affecting real
estate.

Again, it is Whittaker's experience as a lawyer speaking, because he is aware of the sensitiveness of real estate titles.
His skill in clear thinking, logical reasoning is evident in
almost all of his opinions. A good example is General Electric
Co. v. Central Transit Warehouse Co.,53 in which he argued:
We recognize, of course, that venue can be waived. So can
jurisdiction over the person be waived. But does such a waiver
of either or both - made after an action has been "commenced" (by the mere filing of a complaint with the clerk in
any district... ) - establish that the action "might have been
brought" there, in the sense of that phrase as used in Section
1404 (a), Title 28 U.S.C.A.? If it does, what, if any, meaning
is left to the phrase "where it might have been brought", as
adopted by Congress and used in the statute? Would not such
construction be to read that phrase entirely out of the statute?
Would not such construction permit transfer of the action to
any district desired by the moving defendants, though they, or
some of them, could not have been served with process there,
and no statutory venue existed there, and the action could not
have been maintained there, without their intentional waiver
of venue and entry of general appearance?

His opinions give the impression of a judge who is very sure
of himself and who has a strong conviction as to the correctness
of his decisions. But he is humble and big enough to acknowledge his error as he did in granting a rehearing in General
Electric Co. v. Central Transit Warehouse Co. 54

His confidence in his legal ability shows up in at least two
other ways. He does not hesitate to point out to counsel that a
cited case is beside the point or readily distinguishable. 15 And
while he follows the law as he understands it, and has a reverence
for precedent, he is quick, to disregard a decision if he thinks it
is wrong, unless it is binding upon him. Thus, in Miller v. United
States, 51 he wrote:
Defendant cites and relies upon the case of Brewer v. United
States, D.C., 117 F. Supp. 842. I am unable to agree with that
decision.
127 F. Supp. 817; 825-26 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
Id. at 827.
55 Thus in Cowley v. Auto Transports, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 689, 691 (W.D. Mo.
1954), he stated: "Plaintiff . . . presses . . . the case of .... I find the case does
not touch the question here." And in Rosenfeld v. Continental Building Operating
Co., 135 F. Supp. 465, 469 (W.D. Mo. 1955), he asserted: "Plaintiff . . . relies
upon the case of ... as controlling. But it is not at all controlling."
56 124 F. Supp. 203, 205 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
53

54
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And again in Southern Kansas Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 51 he asserts:
But
It must be admitted that the Clarke case . . holds ....
that case is out of harmony with every other case which we
have been able to find upon the precise point here considered.

While his training and long experience as a lawyer is recognizable throughout his opinions, his early farm life occasionally
shows through, as it did in Miller v. Connell:58
This is not only opposed to the evidence, but is also opposed
to the common practice - widely known in this area, even
to the Court - which is that many cattle men run herds of
brood cows on rented pastures in the Blue Stem area of Kansas
for the production of a calf crop and that the area - even
though open - is ideal for the purpose. And the notion that
cows with suckling calves will gain weight on pasture is entirely
erroneous. They do mighty well if they hold their own.

His Work on the Supreme Court
As an associate justice of the Supreme Court from March 25,
1957, through the end of the year, Justice Whittaker participated
in fifty-nine published opinions. (nineteen per curiam), writing
three of the decisions for the majority and joining in dissenting
opinions ten times. His first written opinion was in Fourco Glass
Co. v. TransmirraProductsCorp., 59 involving the proper venue
of a patent infringement suit. Speaking for eight of the justices
(Justice Harlan dissented believing that the Reviser's Notes had
been given undue weight), he held that the specific venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) prevailed over the general venue
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).
The other two decisions both concerned habeas corpus proceedings by aliens facing deportation. In Lehmann v. United
States ex rel. Carson6 ° he found that the 1952 Immigration and
Naturalization Act specifically provided for the deportation of
an alien who had been convicted of two crimes, even though the
operation of the statute of limitations in the immigration law
under which he entered had given him a nondeportable status.
Justices Black and Douglas dissented on the ground that the
1952 Act as so applied was invalid as ex post facto legislation.
6 1 a companion case to Lehmann,
Mulcahey v. Catalanotte,
involved similar questions and was similarly decided. Justices
57
58

134 F. Supp. 502, 506 (W.D. Mo. 1955).

r9

353 U.S. 222 (1957).

60
61

353 U.S. 685 (1957).
353 U.S. 690 (1957).

141 F. Supp. 361, 363 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
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Black and Douglas again dissented.
It is noteworthy that in all ten of his dissents Justice Whittaker joined with justices from the foursome of Frankfurter, Burton, Harlan and Clark. He joined in dissent with Justices Frankfurter, Burton and Harlan in three federal employer liability
cases; 61 in a fourth such case he teamed with Justice Harlan;6"
and in a fifth was found with Justices Frankfurter, Clark and
Harlan. 64 In two of his remaining five dissents he again joined
the trio of Frankfurter, Harlan and Burton. One of these involved the jurisdictional problem of the realignment of parties, 65
another a stockholders derivative suit.6 6 He joined in dissent
with Frankfurter and Harlan in a case involving the validity of a
city ordinance requiring felons to register, 67 and with Justices
68
Burton and Harlan in another which concerned an I.C.C. order.
In the remaining dissent, he agreed with Justices Harlan, Burton
and Clark in opposing the majority view that a card-carrying
if there had been no "meaningful
Communist was not deportable
69
association" with the party.
In none of his ten dissents did he join with any justice in the
foursome of Warren, Black, Douglas and Brennan. However,
he did join with them in several instances to constitute the
majority.70 This is further illustrated by two opinions written
for the majority by Mr. Justice Whittaker and handed down on
January 13, 1958. In both instances, members of the foursome,
which he had joined in the ten dissents, themselves dissented
from his opinions.
Speaking for seven justices in Staub v. City of Baxley, 71 he
reasoned that a city ordinance was unconstitutional as placing
conditions precedent upon the exercise of rights guaranteed by

62 Baltimore & 0. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 353 U.S. 325 (1957); Arnold v. Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co., 353 U.S. 360 (1957); and Deen v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co.,
353 U.S. 925 (1957).
63 Thomson v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 353 U.S. 926 (1957).
64 Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 354 U.S. 901 (1957).
65 Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957).
66 Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114 (1957).
67 Lambert v. California, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 4059 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1957) (No. 47).
68 Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 436
(1957).
69 Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 4034 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1957) (No. 5).
70 See Green v. United States, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 4062 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1957) (No.
46); Moore v. Michigan, 26 U.S.L. WEnK 4023 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1957) (No. 42);
Office Employes International Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957).
71 26 U.S.L. WEK 4079 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1958) (No. 48).
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the first and fourteenth amendments by requiring a permit or
license from the mayor and city council before members could
be solicitated for any organization which required membership
dues or could assess fees against its members. Justice Frankfurter and Clark dissented on the procedural ground that defendant had failed to comply with the state's requirement that
constitutional objections must be to specific sections of an ordinance rather than to the ordinance as a whole.
In the second case, that of Lawn v. United States,7 2 six justices,
speaking through Justice Whittaker, affirmed the conviction and
held, among other things, that the defendant had intentionally
waived objection to certain "tainted" exhibits (photostatic copies
of a check and check stub) by permitting them to be received
without objection and making use of them for his own purposes.
Justice Harlan, with whom Justices Frankfurter and Brennan
joined, dissented believing that the government should have established that it had available untainted copies of those exhibits,
as it claimed.
While in Lawn (and in the companion case of Giglio v. United
States)7 3 he found that the evidence supported the conviction,
in an opinion written for a unanimous court and handed down
a week earlier he decided that the evidence did not sustain the
conviction.7 4 Justices Frankfurter, Harlan and Brennan favored
reversal in each case. Also, while he led the Court in invalidating
the ordinance in Staub, it should be remembered that he joined
the dissent in Lambert7 ' , desiring to uphold the ordinance requiring felons to register. Justices Warren, Black, Douglas and Brennan voted to strike down the ordinances in both instances.
Is there any pattern emerging from Justice Whittaker's voting
record on the Supreme Court? There appears to be one, and I
think it is this. He hews consistently to the law as he understands it and votes his convictions independently of any possible
divisions within the Court. He is thus found on both sides. Nor
may his action be predicted on the basis of any liberal or conservative bent, for he is giving evidence of being neither. He
appears to be neutral in the contest between the supremacy of
federal and state law. He gives expression to no prejudice in
favor of or against the exercise of federal jurisdiction. In the
72 26 U.S.L. WEaK 4087 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1958) (Nos. 9, 10).
73

74
89).
75

Ibid.

Heikkinen v. United States, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 4075 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1958) (No.
Lambert v. California 26 U.S.L. WEEK 4059 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1957) (No. 47).
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application of precedent and general principles, lawyers and
judges sometimes legitimately may reach different conclusions;
and the judge who follows the law uninfluenced by any liberal,
conservative, or other predilection, is often harder to predict
than one who does. On the basis of his decisions to date, Justice
Whittaker cannot be closely identified with either of the recognizable groups within the Court; yet it is probable that his interpretation of the law will eventually be shown to be more frequently in accord with that of the conclusions listed below.
Conclusions
His opinions will be well received by the legal profession, will
be well-written, scholarly, tightly reasoned, drawn almost exclusively on conventional legal authorities and materials. He will
base each vote entirely on his understanding of the law after
research and discussion, will call each case as he sees it, but in
serious splits he usually will be found with Justices Frankfurter,
Burton, Harlan and Clark, or a combination of them.
He will regret that heavy dockets prevent the members of the
Court from more often reconciling their differences through
more extensive discussions and conferences and thus achieving
a greater degree of unanimity in their decisions.
He will be dedicated to his task and that of good judicial
administration and will fully appreciate the role of the Court in
giving direction to the development of the American legal system.
The sound theory of legal development which he took to the
Supreme Court of the United States cannot be better shown than
by quoting a statement he himself made a little over a year ago.
Justice cannot be produced through any system of procedures
alone. In the main it is, and must always be, the product of
long hours of hard, diligent, painstaking labor by highly competent, experienced, careful and practical lawyers. . . . The
practice of law is a deliberate science and must be recognized
as such. Its product will not be any better, regardless of the
system used, than the lawyers who do its work.7 6

76 Time, March 11, 1957, p. 17.
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APPENDIX
Opinions Written By Mr. Justice Whittaker Through
January 13, 1958 -
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
Heikkinen v. United States, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 4075 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1958) (No. 89).
Lawn v. United States, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 4087 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1958) (Nos. 9 & 10).
Lehmann v. United States, 353 U.S. 685 (1957).
Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692 (1957).
Staub v. City of Baxley, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 4079 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1958) (No. 48).

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Apperwhite v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 239 F.2d 306 (8th Cir. 1957).
Fitts' Estate v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1956) (dissent).
Hartman v. Lauchli, 238 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1956).
Kleven v. United States, 240 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1957).
Mesirow v. Duggan, 240 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1957).
Mitchell v. Burgess, 239 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1956).
Moog Industries v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956).
Raffety v. Parker, 241 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1957).
Schmidt v. United States, 237 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1956).
Schneider v. Kelm, 723 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1956).
Soso v. Atlas Powder Co., 238 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1956).
United States v. Mills, 237 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1956).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Ark. 1956).
Baker v. Dale, 123 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
Carpenter v. Borden Co., 147 F .Supp. 445 (S.D. Iowa 1956).
Collins v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 129 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
Cooke v. Ford Motor Co., 122 F. Supp. 644 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
Cowley v. Auto Transports, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 689 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
Davis v. University of Kansas City, 129 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
Exhibitors Serv., Inc. v. Abbey Rents, 135 F. Supp. 112 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
Farm Bureau Cooperative Mill and Supply, Inc. v. Blue Star Foods, 137 F. Supp.
486 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
Foreman Co. v. Zachry Co., 122 F. Supp. 859 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
Foreman Co. v. Zachry Co., 127 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
General Elec. Co. v. Central Transit Warehouse Co., 127 F. Supp. 817 (W.D. Mo.
1955).
Hart v. Leihy, 122 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
Henley v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 138 F. Supp. 768 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
In re Market Basket, 122 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
In re McKinley, 138 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
In re Patterson, 139 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
Jerrold-Stephens Co. v. Gustaveson, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 11 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
Jones Truck Line v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 697 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
Lane v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 122 F. Supp. 694 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
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Miller v. Connell, 141 F. Supp. 361 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
Miller v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 203 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
Pucci v. Blatz Brewing Co., 127 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
Rosenfeld v. Continental Bldg. Operating Co., 135 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
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United States v. Hockett, 123 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
United States v. Hockett, 123 F. Supp. 106 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
United States v. Harris, 133 F. Supp. 796 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
United States v. One 1954 Cadillac, 135 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
United States v. Sweet, 133 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
Weldon v. Steele, 125 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
Wessing v. American Indemnity Co., 127 F. Supp. 775 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
Western Newspaper Union v. Woodward, 133 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
Wiles v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 134 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
Wright v. Steele, 125 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1954).

FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS
Cole v. Riss & Co., 16 F.R.D. 116 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
Cole v. Riss & Co., 16 F.R.D. 263 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
Collins v. Thompson, 16 F.R.D. 194 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
Federal Enterprises, Inc. v. Allbritten Motors, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 190 (W.D. Mo.
1954).
Helverson v. Newbery Co., 16 F.R.D. 330 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
Jenkins v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 18 F.R.D. 267 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
Perry v. Edwards, 16 F.R.D. 131 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
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